– By Erin Viner
U.S. President Donald Trump unveiled the political portion of his long-awaited Mideast peace proposal at the White House on 28 January 2020, while standing alongside Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. The 80-page plan is entitled: “Peace to Prosperity: A Vision to Improve the Lives of the Palestinian and Israeli People” (henceforth, referred to as the “Vision”). The economic part of the plan, entitled: “Peace to Prosperity: Overall Vision Goals within Ten Years” was attached, after having first been published 22 June 2019 and presented by Senior White House Advisor and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner at workshop in Bahrain on 25–26 June 2019.
The Trump plan is based on a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. It declared “support” for the creation of an independent, sovereign State of Palestine with a capital on the outskirts of East Jerusalem within four years, contingent upon Palestinian accomplishment of several self-governance criteria detailed in the proposal.
As follows is a brief description of the Vision’s 22 sections and two appendices.
SECTION ONE: A glossary of regional terms and acronyms is followed by an INTRODUCTION of a brief background of the Israeli-Palestinian dispute. This section acknowledges that both peoples “suffered greatly from their long-standing and seemingly interminable conflict,” that “the State of Israel has made peace with two of its neighbors” namely Egypt and Jordan, and that lack of peace with the Palestinians “has kept other Arab countries from normalizing their relationships [with Israel] and jointly pursuing a stable, secure, and prosperous region.” It concludes with the authors’ statement, “We believe that if more Muslim and Arab countries normalize relations with Israel it will help advance a just and fair resolution to the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, and prevent radicals from using this conflict to destabilize the region.”
OSLO: a synopsis of several interim agreements reached between Israel and the Palestine Liberation Organization in 1993 known collectively as the Oslo Accords. After pointing out that these pacts left “numerous key issues unresolved pending the completion of permanent status negotiations, including, among other items, borders, security, refugees and Jerusalem;” the Trump team stated “Only a comprehensive agreement, coupled with a strong economic plan for the Palestinians and others, has the capacity to bring lasting peace to the parties.”
REALISTIC TWO-STATE SOLUTION: This section points out that “Gaza and the West Bank are politically divided. Gaza is run by Hamas, a terror organization that has fired thousands of rockets at Israel and murdered hundreds of Israelis. In the West Bank, the Palestinian Authority is plagued by failed institutions and endemic corruption. Its laws incentivize terrorism and Palestinian Authority controlled media and schools promote a culture of incitement. It is because of the lack of accountability and bad governance that billions of dollars have been squandered and investment is unable to flow into these areas to allow the Palestinians to thrive.” Saying that “The Palestinians deserve a better future and this Vision can help them achieve that future,” the plan calls for a “realistic Two-State solution in which a secure and prosperous State of Palestine is living peacefully alongside a secure and prosperous State of Israel in a secure and prosperous region;” that “would give the Palestinians all the power to govern themselves but not the powers to threaten Israel.”
This is followed by a paragraph called OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL COOPERATION, in which it is argued that “common threats” and the pursuit of “common interests” can pave a path toward “previously unimaginable opportunities and alliances” in the region, toward realization of the “unlocking of opportunities for millions of people.” An example is provided as to how “threats posed by Iran’s radical regime” have led “to a new reality, where the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors now share increasingly similar perceptions of the threats to their security.”
ECONOMIC VISION FOR A PROSPEROUS FUTURE: addresses “what the future for the Palestinians could be if there were peace,” including claims the plan would double the Palestinian GDP in 10 years, create over 1 million new jobs, reduce unemployment to below 10% and halve the poverty rate.
SECTION TWO: THE APPROACH: After stating “we encourage all to be intellectually honest, open to new ideas, willing to engage on this Vision and take courageous steps toward a better future for themselves and for future generations,” the authors write that the following points guide their approach to the conflict:
OVERVIEW OF UNITED NATIONS EFFORTS: The Trump team states that while “we are respectful of the historic role of the United Nations in the peace process,” their plan will not be “a recitation” of the nearly-700 General Assembly and over 100 Security Council resolutions related to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict that are at times “inconsistent,” “time-bound,” subject to “conflicting interpretations” and “have not brought about peace.”
CURRENT REALITIES: A series of points are provided, calling on both sides to be cognizant that “compromise is necessary to move forward,” and to assess the Vision “holistically.” This is followed by statements asserting that “A peace agreement will be forged only when each side recognizes that it is better off with a peace agreement than without one, even one that requires difficult compromises;” that “There are those who benefit from the status quo and, accordingly, seek to prevent change that would benefit both parties;” “Reciting past narratives about the conflict is unproductive;” “This Vision directly addresses all major issues in an attempt to genuinely resolve the conflict” and not leaving them open for future negotiation; acknowledgement that “Solving this conflict will not solve all the other conflicts in the region;” “It is the Israelis and Palestinians who will have to live with the consequences of a peace agreement” so, too, it is they “who must be satisfied with the benefits and compromises that a peace agreement entails;” that while the U.S. is prepared to facilitate the process, “final, specific details of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement must be worked out directly between the parties; that whereas some leaders in the Mideast “manipulate religion and ideology in order to foment conflict and excuse their failures,” “This Vision aims to be respectful of ideology, religious beliefs and historical claims, but is focused primarily on putting the interests and aspirations of the people first;” that “The Trump Administration has strongly encouraged” the understanding by “courageous leaders” that “new and shared threats have created the need for greater regional cooperation,” and lastly, that “Many Arab countries” formerly “held hostage to this conflict” that “represents an uncapped financial liability to them if it remains unresolved” are now “ready to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict and want to partner with Israel and focus on the serious issues facing the region.”
LEGITIMATE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PARTIES: The 5 major points in this section begins with the assurance that the Vision will address “the Palestinians’ legitimate desire for self-determination” through “the designation of territory for a future Palestinian state, strengthening Palestinian institutions of self-government, providing Palestinians with the legal status and international standing of a state, ensuring solid security arrangements, and building an innovative network of roads, bridges and tunnels that enables freedom of movement for the Palestinians.” It then acknowledges Israel’s “legitimate desire to be the nation-state of the Jewish people,” and calls for “that status to be recognized throughout the world.” The aim of the Trump plan is to “achieve mutual recognition” of “the State of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people” and “the State of Palestine as the nation-state of the Palestinian people,” in which the citizens of both states possess “equal civil rights” within their respective nations. The Vision aims to “achieve the recognition by, and normalization with, those countries who do not currently recognize” either the Israeli or Palestinian states.
THE PRIMACY OF SECURITY: The Vision remains mindful that even if a peace treaty is achieved, “there will always exist those who desire to undermine security and stability.” It is then noted that not only has Israel “faced, and continues to face, enemies that call for its annihilation,” but it has “also had the bitter experience of withdrawing from territories that were then used to launch attacks against it” – in reference to the 2005 Gaza Disengagement. As there is “no margin for error” given the “extraordinary geographic and geostrategic challenges” faced by Israel, a regime in West Bank similar to the “dangerous” one in Gaza “by Hamas” “would pose “an existential threat” Israel. Any future Palestinian state must have “tools to succeed” and be “peaceful and secure, rather than a platform for instability and conflict.” Other nations should adopt Washington’s approach, which would “cannot any country, let alone the State of Israel, a close ally, to make compromises that would exacerbate an already precarious security situation,” and would only advance compromises toward greater security in the short and long terms. World governments must “unambiguously condemn all forms of terrorism” and “work together to fight against global terrorism.” Counterterrorism between Israel and a future Palestinian state (as well as other regional partners) would be to the benefit of both, and current coordination between the sides “provides hope that this can be achieved.” The Vision was drawn up after “the security needs of, and future strategic threats to, Israelis, Palestinians and the region” were taken into account.
THE QUESTION OF TERRITORY, SELF-DETERMINATION AND SOVEREIGNTY: This portion begins by stating “Any realistic peace proposal requires the State of Israel to make a significant territorial compromise” to enable a viable Palestinian state, “respect their dignity and address their legitimate national aspirations.” It goes on to point out that Israel has “already withdrawn from at least 88% of the territory it captured in 1967” in accordance with Palestinian and international demands; going on to state that the Vision “ provides for the transfer of sizeable territory by the State of Israel” to which it has “valid legal and historical claims” and “are part of the ancestral homeland of the Jewish people” — which is to be “considered a significant concession.” The Vision entails the creation of corridors of transportation to ensure travel contiguity for the Palestinians, maximization of self-determination, definition of sovereignty in accordance with “agreements that set parameters essential to each nation” and the “uprooting” of neither Arabs nor Jewish people from their homes.
REFUGEES: After stating that the UN has requested over $8.5 billion in 2020 in new funding to meet the needs of some 70 million world refugees, the Vision acknowledges that “The Arab-Israeli conflict created both a Palestinian and Jewish refugee problem” inflicting suffering to both peoples. Over the past 70 years, the Palestinians “have been treated as pawns on the broader Middle East chessboard, and empty promises have been made to them and to their host countries.” Therefore, “A just, fair and realistic solution to the Palestinian refugee issue is necessary” to fully resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, while “A just solution for these Jewish refugees should be implemented through an appropriate international mechanism separate from the Israel-Palestinian Peace Agreement.
JERUSALEM: This section underscores the holiness of Jerusalem “to multiple faiths” with “religious significance for much of humanity,” and calls for the treatment of holy sites in the city – “particularly the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif” with the “utmost sensitivity.” The Vision finds that “The State of Israel has been a good custodian of Jerusalem” as “During Israel’s stewardship, it has kept Jerusalem open and secure;” and calls for the city to be a place which “unites people and should always remain open to worshippers of all religions.”
THE PROBLEM OF GAZA: While “Gaza has tremendous potential” it is “currently held hostage by Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and other terrorist organizations committed to Israel’s destruction,” states the plan, adding that these groups “have not improved the lives of the people living there,” but only increased suffering in the pursuit of power and increased “malign activity.” The document accepts Israel’s stance that security over Gaza had to be “tightened” to “prevent weapons, and materials that are used to make weapons” from entering the territory. The vision calls or “Any acceptable solution must allow goods to pass through so that the Gaza economy can thrive while making sure Israel’s legitimate security concerns are addressed,” but that Washington “does not expect the State of Israel to negotiate with any Palestinian government that includes any members of Hamas, PIJ or surrogates thereof, unless that Palestinian government (including its members from Hamas or PIJ) unambiguously and explicitly commit to nonviolence, recognize the State of Israel, and fully satisfy the other Gaza Criteria, set forth in Section 9.” The Vision then explicitly states that Israel will only be expected to implement its terms of a prospective peace treaty on when “the Palestinian Authority, or another body acceptable to Israel, has full control of Gaza, terror organizations in Gaza are disarmed, and Gaza is fully demilitarized.” Moreover, “For comprehensive peace to be achieved, it is up to the Palestinian people to make clear that they reject the ideologies of destruction, terror and conflict, and unite for a better future for all Palestinians.”
INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE: The Trump plan was “developed to reduce over time the Palestinians’ dependence on aid from the international community,” toward the creation of “a thriving Palestinian economy and a viable state.”
SECTION THREE: A VISION FOR PEACE BETWEEN THE STATE OF ISRAEL, THE PALESTINIANS AND THE REGION: “Both parties must make significant and difficult compromises to achieve greater gains” via “legally binding contracts and agreements (the “ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN PEACE AGREEMENT”).” In addition, it is the U.S. hope that all Arab nations will “immediately begin to normalize relations” and eventually negotiate their own peace treaties with Israel.
SECTION FOUR: A lengthy section is devoted to a conceptual map (Appendix 1) that was designed “for a redrawing of boundaries in the spirit of UNSCR 242,” according to the following principles: Israel’s security requirements will be met and its “valid legal and historical claims” will be taken into account while “significant territorial expansion” is afforded to the Palestinians. The plan includes an ‘enhancement’ of mobility in respective states; with pragmatic transportation solutions in Palestine that would include “state-of-the-art infrastructure solutions” involving new bridges, roads, tunnels and a high-speed “link” to “enable efficient movement between the West Bank and Gaza, crossing over or under the State of Israel’s sovereign territory.”
The document restates that the “State of Israel and the United States do not believe the State of Israel is legally bound to provide the Palestinians with 100 percent of pre-1967 territory (a belief that is consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution 242),” positing that the U.S. plan is a “fair compromise, and contemplates a Palestinian state that encompasses territory reasonably comparable in size to the territory of the West Bank and Gaza pre-1967.”
The Palestinian state would be able to operate out of “certain designated facilities” at Israel’s Haifa and Ashdod ports until it builds its own (described below).
Israel will finally obtain “secure and recognized borders,” and “not have to uproot any settlements.” “About 97% of Israelis in the West Bank will be incorporated into contiguous Israeli territory, and approximately 97% of Palestinians in the West Bank will be incorporated into contiguous Palestinian territory. Land swaps will provide the State of Palestine with land reasonably comparable in size to the territory of pre-1967 West Bank and Gaza.”
Any Palestinians living in enclaves within the contiguous Israeli territory will become citizens of Palestine. While they can remain in place if they so choose, they would be subject to Palestinian civilian administration and Israeli security protocol.
Any Israeli enclaves located within “contiguous Palestinian territory” would remain Israeli and connected to the state “through an effective transportation system.” They could also choose to remain in place; but would be solely subject to Israeli civilian administration and Israeli security.
Israel will extend sovereignty over the Jordan Valley, which is defined as “critical for Israel’s national security.” The two sides would negotiate agreement over existing agricultural enterprises owned or controlled by Palestinians to ensure their continued operation. Palestinians could cross the Jordan Valley to and from Jordan via two new access roads, subject to Israeli security.
The document issued a scathing indictment of Hamas rule in Gaza, calling it “a terror organization, responsible for the murder and maiming of thousands of Israelis. Rather than dedicate themselves to improving the lives of the people of Gaza, Hamas, PIJ and other terror organizations have been dedicated to the destruction of Israel. At the same time, they have brutally repressed Palestinians and diverted hundreds of millions of dollars meant to improve Palestinian lives to fueling a war machine of thousands of rockets and missiles, dozens of terror tunnels and other lethal capabilities. As a result of Hamas’ terror and misrule, the people of Gaza suffer from massive unemployment, widespread poverty, drastic shortages of electricity and potable water, and other problems that threaten to precipitate a wholesale humanitarian crisis.”
It then went on to purport, “This Vision is designed to give Palestinians in Gaza a prosperous future,” including rapidly-built infrastructure “to address Gaza’s pressing humanitarian needs” conditioned on a full ceasefire and demilitarization of the Strip. Israel would continue to “retain sovereignty over territorial waters, which are vital to Israel’s security and which provides stability to the region. “
Land swaps provided by the State of Israel could include both populated and unpopulated areas. So-called Arab “Triangle Communities” (Kafr Qara, Ar’ara, Baha al-Gharbiyye, Umm al Fahm, Qalansawe, Tayibe, Kafr Qasim, Tira, Kafr Bara and Jaljulia) intended to become part of Jordan during 1949 Armistice negotiations would become part of Palestine.
Israel’s security barrier will be “realigned to match the new borders,” and “New, modern and efficient border crossings will be constructed.”
Freedom of access to all religious sites of all faiths in both states should be agreed to and respected by the parties.
An international fund will be established to oversee costs of developing land swap areas for Palestine, all infrastructure improvements and security measures including port facilities, roads, bridges, tunnels, fences, overpasses, rail links, border crossings. None of the costs are expected to be absorbed by either Israel or the State of Palestine.
SECTION FIVE: JERUSALEM
After recognizing the “heightened sensitivity” and uniqueness surrounding Jerusalem “in the history of civilization” so central to Judaism, Christianity and Islam, the Vision underscored its aim “to keep Jerusalem united, make it accessible to all and to acknowledge its holiness to all in a manner that is respectful to all.”
RELIGIOUS ASPECTS OF THE JERUSALEM ISSUE: This section is dedicated to highlighting the importance of Jerusalem to the three monotheistic religions. It details the many holy sites for which Israel accepted responsibility to protect upon reuniting the city after the 1967 Six Day War, with a “commendable record” and the maintenance of “a religious status quo” – unlike “many previous powers that had ruled Jerusalem, and had destroyed the holy sites of other faiths.” For that reason, the Vision advocates the uninterrupted continuation of governance over the Temple Mount/Haram al-Sharif; while also calling for the permissibility of all faiths to pray at the site in accordance “the times of each religion’s prayers and holidays, as well as other religious factors.” This would be a marked departure from today; in that only Muslim prayer is allowed, while Jews and Christians may visit but prayer is prohibited.
POLITICAL STATUS OF JERUSALEM: This issue is defined as “One of the most complicated issues in achieving peace,” and a brief history is provided as to how “Prior to 1967, a divided Jerusalem was a source of great tension in the region, with Jordanian and Israeli forces separated by barbed wire and Israeli residents of Jerusalem endangered by sniper fire.” The document asserts that “A division of Jerusalem would be inconsistent with the policy statements of the Jerusalem Embassy Act of 1995 of the United States. All former presidents who have been involved in the peace process have agreed that Jerusalem should not be physically divided again,” as background as to why President Trump recognized Jerusalem as Israel’s capital on 6 December 2017.
Despite recognition of Jerusalem as “Israel’s undivided capital,” the authors write: “The President also made clear that the specific boundaries of Israeli sovereignty in Jerusalem would be subject to final status negotiations between the parties,” although “We believe that returning to a divided Jerusalem, and in particular having two separate security forces in one of the most sensitive areas on earth, would be a grave mistake.” They nevertheless maintain that the physical barrier blocking off certain Arab neighborhoods in the city “should remain in place and should serve as a border between the capitals of the two parties.”
Thus, even though “Jerusalem will remain the sovereign capital of the State of Israel” and “an undivided city,” the Vision calls for the creation of a “sovereign capital of the State of Palestine should be in the section of East Jerusalem located in all areas east and north of the existing security barrier, including Kafr Aqab, the eastern part of Shuafat and Abu Dis, and could be named Al Quds or another name as determined by the State of Palestine.”
Arab residents “beyond the 1949 armistice lines but inside the existing security barrier” would be free to choose between citizenship in either Israel or Palestine, or to retain their status as permanent residents in Israel.
PRIVILEGES, BENEFITS AND OBLIGATIONS: Arabs who choose to become either Israeli or Palestinian citizens should be afforded all the “privileges, benefits and obligations” as that of other citizens, and there should be no change in these categories for those who decide to opt for permanent residency in Israel.
SPECIAL TOURIST AREA: This section calls for the development of a “world class tourist zone” in “a specific area to be agreed upon by the parties,” which would include “restaurants, shops, hotels, cultural centers, and other tourism facilities” with “fast-track accessibility to the Muslim Holy Shrines” financed by the “economic development program.” Taxation, zoning and other related issues would be negotiated between the Israeli and Palestinian states.
TOURISM MATTERS RELATING TO THE OLD CITY OF JERUSALEM: The Vision calls for the negotiated-creation of “a mechanism” to license Palestinian tour guides to operate in the Old City of Jerusalem as well as other Christian and Muslim holy sites. A “Jerusalem-Al Quds Joint Tourism Development Authority (the “JTDA”) is also to be set up, “to promote Jewish, Muslim and Christian tourism” in both Israel and Palestine;” while working with Jordan to advance regional tourism. The JTDA would receive “part of the tax revenues” generated by the increased tourism through a mechanism created by Israel.
RECOGNITION OF CAPITALS: It is reiterated that “Jerusalem should be internationally recognized as the capital of the State of Israel,” where the U.S. Embassy will remain. “Al Quds (or another name selected by the State of Palestine) should be internationally recognized as the capital of the State of Palestine,” and a U.S. Embassy will be opened “in Al Quds at a location to be chosen by the United States, in agreement with the State of Palestine” after the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement.
Neither side should “encourage or support efforts by other countries or persons to deny the legitimacy of the other party’s capital or its sovereignty,” and “mayors for each capital city will establish mechanisms for regular consultation and voluntary cooperation on matters of significance to the two capitals.”
SECTION SIX: THE TRUMP ECONOMIC PLAN: This section reviews the economic portion of the administration’s Middle East Peace Economic Plan entitled “Peace to Prosperity: A New Vision for the Palestinian People,” which was presented in Bahrain June 2019. In sum, it promotes a $50 billion investment fund over ten years to support or create 179 regional infrastructure and business projects that would be administered by a “multilateral development bank.” It is envisioned that a free market economy and “pro-growth tax structure” would lead to the creation of more than one million jobs, the doubling of the Palestinian GDP, halving of the poverty rate, drop of the current 31% unemployment to single digits, and rise of exports from 17% to 40% of the GDP. Other expected yields would be a 50% drop in infant mortality from 18 to 9 per 1000 births, surge of female participation in the work force from 20% to 35% and increase in life expectancy from 74 to 80 years.
Arab states and wealthy private investors would provide most of the financing, structured to include $26 billion in loans, $13.5 billion in grants, and $11 billion in private investment.
While most of the money would go to the West Bank and Gaza, earmarked for specific projects such as the travel corridor to link the two areas as outlined above, as well as upgrades to the health, energy, land registry, employment, tourism, export, water and waste treatment sectors. It also calls for the creation of a new Palestinian university.
Other allocations of the funds include $9 billion to Egypt, $7 billion to Jordan and $6.3 billion in Lebanon aimed at founding key trading partnerships with Palestine.
The “three initiatives” of the plan are (1) to “unleash the economic potential of the Palestinian people,” by “developing property and contract rights, the rule of law, anti-corruption measures, capital markets, a pro-growth tax structure, and a low-tariff scheme with reduced trade barriers, this initiative envisions policy reforms coupled with strategic infrastructure investments that will improve the business environment and stimulate private-sector growth. Hospitals, schools, homes, and businesses will secure reliable access to affordable electricity, clean water, and digital services. Billions of dollars of new investment will flow into various sectors of the Palestinian economy. Businesses will have increased access to capital, and the markets of the West Bank and Gaza will be connected with key trading partners, including Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and Lebanon. The resulting economic growth has the potential to end the current unemployment crisis and transform the West Bank and Gaza into a center of opportunity.” (2) to “empower the Palestinian people to realize their ambitions,” through new data-driven, outcomes-based education options at home, expanded online education platforms, increased vocational and technical training, and the prospect of international exchanges, this initiative will enhance and expand a variety of programs that directly improve the well-being of the Palestinian people. It will strengthen the Palestinian educational system and ensure that students can fulfill their academic goals and be prepared for the workforce.” “Quality healthcare will be dramatically improved, as Palestinian hospitals and clinics will be outfitted with the latest healthcare technology and equipment. In addition, new opportunities for cultural and recreational activities will improve the quality of life of the Palestinian people. From parks and cultural institutions to athletic facilities and libraries, this initiative’s projects will enrich public life throughout the West Bank and Gaza.” (3) To “enhance Palestinian governance, improving the public sector’s ability to serve its citizens and enable private-sector growth. This initiative will support the public sector in undertaking the improvements and reforms necessary to achieve long-term economic success. A commitment to upholding property rights, improving the legal and regulatory framework for businesses, adopting a growth-oriented, enforceable tax structure, and developing robust capital markets will increase exports and foreign direct investment. A fair and independent judicial branch will ensure this pro-growth environment is protected and that civil society flourishes. New systems and policies will help bolster government transparency and accountability. International partners will work to eliminate the Palestinian public sector’s donor dependency and put the Palestinians on a trajectory to achieve long-term fiscal sustainability. Institutions will be modernized and made more efficient to facilitate the most effective delivery of essential services for the citizens. With the support of the Palestinian leadership, this initiative can usher in a new era of prosperity and opportunity for the Palestinian people and institutionalize the policies required for successful economic transformation.”
Just as the State of Palestine would be required to “comply in all respects with the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement,” the “Peace to Prosperity” program “will be conditioned upon (i) the establishment by the State of Palestine of transparent, independent, and credit-worthy financial institutions capable of engaging in international market transactions in the same manner as financial institutions of western democracies, (ii) the establishment of appropriate governance to ensure the proper use of funds, and (iii) the establishment of a legal system that protects investments and addresses commercial expectations.”
SECTION SEVEN: SECURITY: “This Vision is designed to enable Israelis and Palestinians to live in peace and to reduce the risk of terrorism.” Israel is to be assigned “overriding security responsibility” for Palestine,” which should “be responsible for as much of their internal security as possible.” Jordan can assist Israel with as many security considerations for Palestine as is agreed between Jerusalem and Amman. Israel and Palestine should maintain close security coordination, with assistance from Jordan and Egypt, as determined necessary. Palestine will “not be burdened” with the cost of “defense from external threats,” which “will be shouldered by the State of Israel.”
Appendix 2A contains “a broad outline of some the acute security challenges facing the State of Israel.” Appendix 2B sets out the criteria for Palestinian security performance (the “SECURITY CRITERIA”). Appendix 2C outlines the permanent requirement that Palestine “shall be fully demilitarized.”
Other key points include:
A reduction of Israeli security involvement as Palestine becomes increasingly able to meet Security Criteria, as set out in the Vision.
The U.S. and Israel will continue efforts to strengthen the Palestinian Authority Security Forces (PASF).
The mission of the PASF: maintenance of internal security, prevention of terror attacks” within Palestine or against Israel, Jordan and Egypt; enforcement of public order, law, counterterrorism and border security (jointly with Israel, Jordan and Egypt, as described below), protection of government officials and foreign dignitaries, and disaster response.
Failure by Palestine to “meet all or any of the Security Criteria at any time” empowers Israel “to reverse the process outlined above.”
A security review committee (the “REVIEW COMMITTEE”) of Israeli, Palestinian and U.S. representatives will be set up to hold a bi-annual assessment of bilateral security coordination compliance with Security Criteria; and “facilitate necessary infrastructure changes and related investments (by the International Fund) on the ground.”
Washington also urges the creation of a Regional Security Committee (RSC) of U.S., Israeli, Palestinian, Jordanian, Egyptian, Saudi and the United Arab Emirates’ officials to regularly “review regional counterterrorism policies and coordination.”
SECTION EIGHT: CROSSINGS: The plan envisions that once the threat of terrorism has been downgraded, an improved system should be put in place to facilitate “a rapid flow of goods and people through the borders in a dignified, extremely efficient system of crossings that does not compromise security.” Toward that end, a board of overseers (the “CROSSINGS BOARD”) comprised of 3 Israelis, 3 Palestinians and 1 American should hold quarterly meeting to “constructively find ways to improve the flow and treatment of people using the crossings.” The Crossings Board will develop goals provide annual reports on the attainment of such goals to the governments of Palestine, Israel, Jordan and Egypt.
All persons and goods crossing into Palestine must go through regulated borders monitored by Israel.
Israel has the right to use “state of the art scanning and imaging technology” to ensure that “no weapons, dual-use or other security-risk related items” are permitted to enter Palestine.
“Only security-vetted individuals and companies will be permitted to transport, store or utilize” raw materials required by Palestine for production that could serve a “dual-use” for weapons-manufacturing.
SECTION NINE: GAZA CRITERIA: Israel will only “implement its obligations” under a peace treaty after the Palestinian Authority (or another national or international body acceptable to Israel) has acquired “full control of Gaza,” following the absolute disarmament of Hamas, PIJ, and all other militias and terror organizations. Palestine must return all Israeli captives or their remains.
Hamas involvement in the Palestinian government is conditional on its commitment to peace with Israel, adoption of the Quartet principles including unambiguous and explicit recognition of Israel, commitment to nonviolence, and acceptance of all previous agreements and obligations between the parties – including the disarming of all terrorist groups.
The economic plan (and release of funding) will only go into effect once these criteria have been met. The Vision also notes that the international community “should be willing to provide compensation in the form of major investment for a complete and verifiable demilitarization of Gaza.”
The document cites Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza nearly 15 years ago as a means “to advance peace;” thwarted by Hamas – which is referred to as a “repressive,”” internationally recognized terrorist group” that “exploited” the people of Gaza as “hostages and human shields” who have been “bullied into submission.” It accuses Hamas of having “failed the people of Gaza” by diverting money from international donors “to attack the State of Israel” rather than improve inhabitants’ lives.
SECTION TEN: FREE TRADE ZONE: A negotiated free-trade zone between Palestine and Jordan should be established to expedite economic cooperation between the two countries, involving export of goods from a Jordanian airport.
SECTION ELEVEN: TRADE AGREEMENT WITH THE UNITED STATES: The U.S. will “continue to provide duty-free treatment to goods coming from all areas that enjoy such treatment today,” and negotiate a free trade agreement with Palestine – with whom it is hoped “countries in Europe, the Middle East and elsewhere will also pursue free trade agreements.”
SECTION TWELVE: PORT FACILITIES: This Vision hopes to “enhance Palestinian economic activity” while protecting Israeli security with the provision of a future port in Palestine. Israel is called upon to allow Palestine to use “earmarked facilities” at its Haifa and Ashdod ports “without prejudice” of “Israel’s undisputed sovereignty” over these locations, to facilitate Palestinian economic benefit over access to the Mediterranean Sea. Israel is to maintain security over Palestinian activities at the sites, similar to that conducted at other international border crossings.
Jordan is called upon to authorize Palestinian use of “an earmarked facility” at its port of Aqaba “without prejudice to “Jordan’s undisputed sovereignty” over the site to facilitate Palestinian economic benefit over access to the Red Sea. Jordan will oversee security considerations.
Palestine will be responsible for charging, collecting and ownership of all taxes associated with goods entering the earmarked Israeli and Jordanian port facilities.
POTENTIAL GAZA PORT AND POTENTIAL AIRPORT FOR GAZA: 5 years after signing the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement and if requirements of the Gaza Criteria have been met, Gaza has the right to create an artificial island off its coast to develop a port and an airport for small aircraft. The specific location of the facilities is to be determined during negotiations. After development of the port, Palestine shall no longer have rights to utilize the earmarked port facilities in (i) Haifa and Ashdod, unless agreed to by the State of Israel, and (ii) Aqaba, unless agreed to by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan.
SECTION THIRTEEN: DEAD SEA RESORT AREA: Palestine will be permitted to develop a resort area in the North of the Dead Sea, without prejudice to the State of Israel’s sovereignty over the area. The resort will not alter current distribution of natural resources of the Sea between Jordan and Israel. A road to facilitate travel from Palestine to the resort will be built, “subject to Israeli security considerations.”
SECTION FOURTEEN: WATER AND WASTEWATER TREATMENT: The parties are called on to “recognize mutual water rights,” “agree to equitably share existing cross border water sources,” and “cooperate in making additional sources available through existing and emerging technologies.” The plan also entails the management of “shared aquifers… for sustainable use to prevent impairing the groundwater quality or damaging the aquifers through over-extraction,” and consideration of hydrological and climatic conditions, among other factors, while managing extraction. The parties are also compelled to “prioritize investing in desalination and other emerging technologies to produce substantial additional quantities of water for all uses,” and “jointly seek to provide easily available, reasonably priced water to both parties.”
The parties must also agree to also focus investment in wastewater treatment, wastewater recycling and reuse to control and minimize pollution of the shared ground-waters; while working together in good faith to manage the details with respect to water and wastewater treatment issues.
SECTION FIFTEEN: PRISONERS: Once all Israeli captives and remains have been returned, all Palestinian prisoners and administrative detainees held in Israeli prisons will be released in two phases, “except (i) those convicted of murder or attempted murder, (ii) those convicted of conspiracy to commit murder (in each case murder includes murder by terrorism) and (iii) Israeli citizens.
Phase 1 will occur immediately after the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, and include minors, women, those over the age of 50, ill health or have already served more than two-thirds of their terms. Phase II will include all remaining eligible prisoners at a time negotiated between the parties.
All of the released prisoners will become citizens of the State of Palestine. Israel must grant amnesty to any Palestinians who committed offenses other than those described in clauses (i), (ii) or (iii), prior to the signing of the peace agreement and live abroad. Those who receive such amnesty will be allowed to enter Palestine. They also have the right to seek asylum in a third country.
Release of eligible prisoners is contingent upon their signing of “a pledge to promote within their community the benefits of co-existence between Israelis and Palestinians, and to conduct themselves in a manner that models co-existence.” Refusal to sign the pledge will result in continued incarceration.
SECTION SIXTEEN: REFUGEES: This section underscores the creation of both Palestinian and Jewish refugee problems in the Arab-Israeli conflict, noting that “nearly the same number of Jews and Arabs were displaced.” Separate from the Israel-Palestinian Peace Agreement, the document advocates compensation be made to the Jewish refugees forced to flee Arab and Muslim countries for their lost assets, as well as to Israel to cover the massive cost of having absorbed them.
While almost all of the Jews have since “been accepted and permanently resettled in Israel and other countries around the world,” the Arabs have “been isolated and kept from living as citizens in the many Arab countries in the region.” It adds that “the Palestinians have collectively been cruelly and cynically held in limbo to keep the conflict alive,” and that “their Arab brothers have the moral responsibility to integrate them into their countries as the Jews were integrated into the State of Israel.” Several historical examples of this are provided, including Lebanon – where Palestinians are discriminated against by bans on property ownership, employment without hard-to-obtain work permits (even for those born in Lebanon), as well as denial of “desirable occupations” in the legal, medical or engineering fields.
It also notes that 1950-2017, the U.S. contributed approximately $6.15 billion to United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) for Palestinian refugees. Over just the past 10 years, Washington’s donation of $2.99 billion ($3.16 billion in 2017 terms) accounted for 28% of all contributions to UNRWA. After restating that “unfortunately, Palestinian refugees have been treated as pawns in the broader Middle East chessboard” amid “empty promises” to them and to their host countries, the document acknowledged that “a just, fair and realistic solution to the Palestinian refugee issue must be found in order to resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.”
The Vision advocates resolution of the matter along the following lines:
GENERAL FRAMEWORK:
There shall be no right of return by, or absorption of, any Palestinian refugee into the State of Israel,” and the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement will serve as “a complete end” to “all claims relating to refugee or immigration status”.
Palestinians possessing Registered Refugee status by UNRWA have 3 options for permanent residence, via (a) absorption into the State of Palestine (subject to the limitations provided below); local integration in current host countries (subject to those countries consent); or (c) acceptance of 5,000 refugees each year, for up to ten years (50,000 total refugees), in individual Organization of Islamic Cooperation member countries who agree to participate in Palestinian refugee resettlement (subject to those individual countries’ agreement).
The U.S. would work with other countries to establish a framework for the implementation of such options.
COMPENSATION AND ASSISTANCE FRAMEWORK:
Even though refugees absorbed by Palestine will be the beneficiaries of “substantial assistance to develop all key economic and infrastructure sectors” as part of the Trump Economic Plan, some compensation to the displaced individuals will be placed in a trust (the “PALESTINIAN REFUGEE TRUST”) to be administered by two trustees (“TRUSTEES”) appointed by Palestine and the U.S.
The entry of refugees into Palestine coming from nations hostile to Israel (e.g. Syria, Lebanon) must be authorized by a joint-committee of Israelis and Palestinians, and “limited in accordance with agreed security arrangements.”
The “rate of movement” of refugees from outside Gaza and the West Bank into Palestine shall be agreed to by the parties and regulated by various factors – including economic forces and incentive structures – so that the influx does not overwhelm Palestine’s development of infrastructure and economy, or increase security risks to the State of Israel.
The so-called “Palestinian refugee status” will officially cease to exist upon the signing of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, and UNRWA will be terminated. Part of the Trump Economic Plan will go toward the replacement of refugee camps in Palestine with new housing developments.
SECTION SEVENTEEN: FOUNDATIONS OF A PALESTINIAN STATE: In order to ensure “a high probability of succeeding,” the following criteria are a predicate to the formation of a Palestinian State.
The Palestinians must implement governance safeguarding “freedom of press, free and fair elections, respect for human rights for its citizens, protections for religious freedom and for religious minorities to observe their faith, uniform and fair enforcement of law and contractual rights, due process under law, and an independent judiciary with appropriate legal consequences and punishment established for violations of the law.”
The Palestinians must establish “transparent, independent, and credit-worthy financial institutions capable of engaging in international market transactions in the same manner as financial institutions of western democracies, with appropriate governance to prevent corruption and ensure the proper use of such funds, and a legal system to protect investments and to address market-based commercial expectations. The State of Palestine should meet the independent objective criteria to join the International Monetary Fund.”
The Palestinians shall have ended all programs, including school curricula and textbooks, that serve to incite or promote hatred or antagonism towards its neighbors, or which compensate or incentivize criminal or violent activity.
They must also achieve civilian and law enforcement control over all of its territory, demilitarize the population and comply with “all the other terms and conditions of this Vision.”
The plan urges the international community to “mobilize a worldwide effort to assist the Palestinians to achieve proper governance;” particularly Jordan, due to its territorial proximity.
Only after completion of the aforementioned measures should Palestine be awarded full membership in international organizations or permitted to establish diplomatic relations with other countries.
SECTION EIGHTEEN: EDUCATION AND CULTURE OF PEACE: This section opens with a quote from President Trump: “Peace can never take root in an environment where violence is tolerated, funded and even rewarded.”
It goes on to stress that “an important element of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement” is the “goal of creating an environment that embraces the values of coexistence and mutual respect throughout the region.” This “culture of peace” must include “an end to incitement, including in government-controlled media, as well as an end to the glorification of violence, terrorism and martyrdom. It should also prohibit hostile propaganda, as well as textbooks, curriculum and related materials contrary to the goal of the Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement, including the denial of one another’s right to exist.”
“A joint Commission on Acceptance and Tolerance will be created to focus on steps that can be taken help the people from both countries heal the wounds that have been created by this conflict and bring the people closer together through dialogue. “
SECTION NINETEEN: ISRAELI-ARAB RELATIONSHIPS; REGIONAL ECONOMIC PARTNERSHIPS:
After hailing Egypt and Jordan’s peace treaties with Israel as “major historic breakthroughs,” the Trump plan calls for “significant and broader cooperation between these countries,” as well throughout the region. The U.S. strongly encourages all Arab countries to negotiate lasting peace accords with Israel for the economic benefit to all. The Vision’s goals include the forming of strong economic partnerships and trade agreements, as well as the integration of transportation infrastructure to transform the region into “a global hub for the movement of goods and services from Asia to Africa and Europe.”
There should be a particular focus on significantly improving the economic and tourism sectors of Palestine, Jordan and Egypt.
A resulting fundamental change in international politics would facilitate an end to anti-Israel initiatives at the United Nations and in other multilateral bodies by the Palestinians and Arab states, as well as efforts to delegitimize Israel. These countries are also expected to end any boycott of the State of Israel and oppose the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement and any other effort to boycott the State of Israel.
Revisionist initiatives that question the Jewish people’s authentic roots in the State of Israel should also cease. Those initiatives fly in the face of not only Jewish and Christian history, but Islamic history as well. An important goal of this Vision is for the State of Israel to be treated by all as a legitimate part of the international community.
NEW OPPORTUNITIES FOR REGIONAL SECURITY INITIATIVES: The plan envisions wide-ranging opportunities for major diplomatic breakthroughs toward broader regional security architecture. This would include joint-efforts by Israel, Palestine and the Arab countries to counter Hezbollah, ISIS, Hamas (if Hamas does not reorient in accordance with the Gaza Criteria), and all other terrorist groups and organizations, as well as other extremist groups.
The document asserts that “Iran’s radical regime has led to a new reality where the State of Israel and its Arab neighbors now share increasingly similar perceptions of the threats to their security;” while they also” increasingly share a vision of stability and economic prosperity for the region.” Whereas “Israel is not a threat to the region whatsoever,” “economic conditions and Iran’s malign activities, however, pose an existential threat to many of the region’s states.”
Israel’s integration into the region “allow it to assist across a wide range of economic challenges, as well as counter the threats of Iran.”
Israel and the Arab countries “have already discovered their common interests in combating terrorist groups” and “the common danger posed by an expansionist Iran,” and are likely to soon face “similar security challenges in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea.” The Vision urges joint-Israeli-Arab-U.S. operations “to protect the freedom of navigation through international straits that are increasingly subject to the threat of Iran, its proxy forces, and terrorist groups.”
Toward this end, an Organization for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (OSCME) consisting of Israel, Palestine, Egypt and Jordan should be formed to confront “issues such as early warning of conflicts, conflict prevention, and crisis management.”
SECTION TWENTY: MUTUAL RECOGNITION BETWEEN NATION STATES:
The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement will provide that the parties recognize the State of Palestine as the nation state of the Palestinian people and the State of Israel as the nation state of the Jewish people.
SECTION TWENTY-ONE: END OF CLAIMS / END OF CONFLICT:
The Israeli-Palestinian Peace Agreement will end the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians, and end all claims between the parties. The foregoing will be proposed in (i) a new UN Security Council resolution, and (ii) a new UN General Assembly resolution.
SECTION TWENTY-TWO: CONDUCT DURING NEGOTIATIONS:
During the peace negotiations, the parties are expected to do the following:
THE STATE OF ISRAEL: will not build any new settlement towns, expand existing settlements or advance plans to build in “areas of the West Bank that are not contemplated by this Vision to be part of the State of Israel.” Israel will also not expand any enclaves referred to in Section 4 or advance plans to expand those enclaves in those areas “beyond their current footprint.”
Israel should not “demolish any structure existing as of the date of this Vision and secure the necessary legislative and/or legal decisions to ensure such an outcome;” although the restriction on demolition is not applicable to illegal or unsafe construction, or punitive actions following acts of terrorism.
In Palestinian enclaves referred to in Section 4, the legal status quo will prevail and the State of Israel will enable the development of those Palestinian communities within their current footprint.
PALESTINIANS: The PLO and the Palestinian Authority shall “refrain from any attempt to join any international organization” without Israel’s consent; take no action and dismiss pending suits against Israel or the U.S. (and their citizens) before the International Criminal Court, the International Court of Justice or any other tribunals.
The Palestinians are forbidden from taking actions against any Israelis or Americans before Interpol.
They must “immediately terminate the paying of salaries to terrorists serving sentences in Israeli prisons, as well as to the families of deceased terrorists (collectively, the “PRISONER & MARTYR PAYMENTS”). Instead, the Palestinians must “develop humanitarian and welfare programs to provide essential services and support to Palestinians in need” – “ that are not based upon the commission of terrorist acts.”
THE UNITED STATES:
To the extent permitted by law, Washington will permit the reopening of the Office of the General Delegation of the Palestine Liberation Organization; and open a ‘Liaison Mission to the Palestinian Authority’ at an appropriate location within the territory designated for the State of Palestine, as determined by the United States; take “appropriate steps to resume U.S. assistance to the West Bank and Gaza, to the extent reasonable and appropriate, in consultation with the U.S. Congress;” and work with the international community to support new initiatives for the Palestinian people, including programs to improve the delivery of electricity and water, ease the movement of goods and help create jobs.
APPENDIX 1: Conceptual Maps: A map of the State of Israel is included, as well as the envisioned Future State of Palestine.
APPENDIX 2A: Security Considerations: The Vision reviews Israel’s history of lacking “a single day of peace with all of its neighbors” since “the moment of its establishment” in 1948, entailing “numerous defensive wars, some existential in nature, as well as asymmetric battles with terrorist groups.” It points out the state of war Israel remains in with Lebanon and Syria involving the “extraordinary risk from the rocket and missile arsenals on its northern border;” as well as “indiscriminate rocket fire from the Gaza Strip” and “grave threat from Iranian ballistic missiles” (including those capable of carrying nuclear warheads), in addition to “belligerent public threats from Iran to wipe the State of Israel off the map.”
It notes that 70% of Israelis and roughly 80% of the country’s industrial capacity is concentrated on the coastal plain adjacent to the West Bank; and that prior to the 1967 Six Day War, that area was only 9 miles across at its narrowest point. A north-south hill ridge in the West Bank provides “any hostile force the ability to topographically dominate the most sensitive parts of Israel’s national infrastructure,” including the Ben Gurion International Airport, hi-tech industries and a major north-south road network that connect Tel Aviv to Haifa in the north and Jerusalem in the east.
These geopolitical concerns were paramount to developing the Vision’s section on Israeli security requirements, “as presented by successive Israeli governments to the United States.”
THE STATE OF ISRAEL’S SECURITY NEEDS:
THE JORDAN VALLEY:
The Jordan Valley be included under Israeli jurisdiction, and that an Israeli withdrawal “would have significant implications for regional security in the Middle East”.
The Valley serves as a “4,600 foot physical barrier against an external attack from the east” pertaining to conventional warfare, in which “Israeli forces deployed along the eastern slopes of the West Bank hill ridge could hold off a numerically superior army until the State of Israel completed its reserve mobilization, which could take 48 hours.”
The plan maintains the Jordan Valley is also “significant” with “regard to terrorism.” Following its unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in 2005, the document maintains that “Israel learned the implications of losing control of the external perimeter of contested territory for counterinsurgency warfare.” The Palestinian territory “became a safe haven, not only for Hamas, but also for international Jihadi groups like the PIJ that undermined the security of Egypt in the Sinai.”
Therefore, the plan warns, if a similar scenario as what occurred in Gaza ensued and “If such groups infiltrated the West Bank, they could create a chaotic security situation for the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, as well as for the State of Israel.”
SECURE LINES OF SUPPLY TO THE JORDAN VALLEY:
The State of Israel must assure for itself secure lines of supply for its forces in the Jordan Valley and the ability to move its military personnel and material into and out of the region.
BEN GURION AIRPORT PERIMETER:
Israel’s main international airport is only 5.9 miles away from the pre-1967 line, vulnerable to shoulder-fired Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS) anti-aircraft missiles used by terrorist organizations, which “are proliferating across the Middle East.” As such, “special security standards for airport defense are necessary to prevent threats to Ben Gurion Airport and nearby air traffic.”
ISRAELI CONTROL OF THE AIRSPACE WEST OF THE JORDAN RIVER:
The Trump Plan details how modern combat aircraft can cover the 40-mile distance from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean in under three minutes, affording Israel with a dearth of time or space enjoyed by larger nations to respond to fast approaching threats, especially from the skies.
“If the State of Israel did not maintain control of the West Bank’s airspace,” states the document, “it would not have adequate time to defend against incoming hostile aircraft or missiles. For that reason, in any peace arrangement, the State of Israel must have operational control over the airspace west of the Jordan River.”
THE PROBLEM WITH INTERNATIONAL FORCES:
The State of Israel has experienced the failure of international troops in Sinai (before 1967), Lebanon, Gaza, and the Golan. Given its experience, Israel’s first doctrine of security – that it must be able to defend itself by itself – is as salient as ever. It is a critical strategic interest of the United States that the State of Israel remain strong and secure, protected by the IDF, and continue to remain an anchor of stability in the region.
IRAN:
“All of Iran’s activity must be taken into account in determining the State of Israel’s security needs,” states the Trump Plan. “Iran’s strategy seeks to encircle Israel, using Lebanon, Syria and Gaza, and encircle the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Iraq, Bahrain and Yemen,” in the hope of “establishing a ‘land bridge’ that stretches from the Iran-Iraq border to the Mediterranean Sea.”
APPENDIX 2B: Security Criteria:
The State of Palestine’s counterterrorism system must encompass “all elements,” ranging from “initial detection of illicit activity to longtime incarceration of perpetrators.”
The system must be comprised of “intelligence officers to detect potential terrorist activity, specially trained counterterrorism forces to raid sites and arrest perpetrators, forensics experts to conduct site exploitation, pretrial detention officers to ensure the retention of prisoners, prosecutors and judges to issue warrants and conduct trials, and post-trial detention officers to ensure prisoners serve their sentences.”
There must be “stand-alone detention facilities” and “vetted personnel.”
A legal system must be put in place that “clearly confronts terrorism” through passage and enforcement of laws banning all terror activity and terror organizations,” prohibition of all “incitement to terrorism,” forbidding “the financing of such activity and organizations;” effective prosecution and appropriate sentencing of anyone either directly or indirectly involved in terrorism; cessation of all direct or indirect payments rewarding terrorism to those involved in terror activity or their families.
Assessment of Palestine’s anti-terror activities will be determined by the “extent of arrests and interdictions of suspects, perpetrators and accomplices; the systematic and comprehensive nature of investigations and interrogations to root out all terror networks and infrastructure; indictments and the extent of punishments; the systematic and comprehensive nature of interdiction efforts to seize weapons and explosives and prevent the manufacturing of weapons and explosives;” and success of preventing the infiltration of Palestine’s security forces by terrorists.
Previous “benchmarks” set by Jordan and Egypt will be used during the negotiation process to “create acceptable initial non-binding metrics with respect to the Security Criteria that are acceptable to the State of Israel,” in consultation with the U.S.
APPENDIX 2C: Demilitarization Criteria and other Security Arrangements:
In addition to the overriding security responsibility over Palestine, Israel will be “responsible for security at all international crossings into Palestine.”
With respect to the Rafah crossing, specific arrangements will be agreed upon between Egypt and Israel “to accomplish the security needs contemplated by this Vision.”
Israel will continue to maintain control over the airspace and the electromagnetic spectrum west of the Jordan River. During the negotiation period, the parties should negotiate in good faith relevant financial issues.
The Israeli Navy will have the” right to block prohibited weapons and weapon-making materials from entering the State of Palestine, including Gaza”.
“Palestine will not have the right to forge military, intelligence or security agreements with any state or organization that adversely affect Israeli security” – as determined by Israel. Palestine will not be able to develop military or paramilitary capabilities inside or outside of its state.
“A demilitarized State of Palestine will be prohibited from possessing capabilities that can threaten the State of Israel including: weapons systems such as combat aircraft (manned and unmanned); heavy armored vehicles; mines; missiles; rockets; heavy machine guns; laser/radiating weapons; anti-air; anti-armor; anti-ship; military intelligence; offensive cyber and electronic warfare capabilities; production facilities and procurement mechanisms for weapons systems; military infrastructure and training facilities; or any weapons of mass destruction”.
“Any expansion of Palestinian security capabilities beyond the capabilities existing on the date this Vision is released shall be subject to agreement with the State of Israel.”
Israel maintains the right to dismantle and destroy any facility in Palestine “used for the production of prohibited weapons or for other hostile purposes.”
While Israel will use its best efforts to minimize incursions into Palestine, it “retains the right to engage in necessary security measure”s to ensure that Palestine continues to be demilitarized and non-threatening to the State of Israel, including from terrorist threats.